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Abstract 
A previous result by Kemnitz (2001) based on AK type endogenous growth model 
implied that the gains from immigration depends up on the percapita possession 
of capital stock by immigrant relative to that of the natives’. However, such a 
framework ignores the incentive labor creates for innovation and productivity. By 
using framework of horizontal innovation of Romer (1991), it is shown that 
immigration entails Pareto improvement even when immigrants posses no 
physical capital in contrast to the result in the literature.  
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Introduction 
The consequence of skilled workers migration for sending and receiving countries 
has been on center of debate. The outflow of skilled labor was initially thought to 
be detrimental to development of sending countries. After a country has invested 
its scarce resources on the schooling of its citizens, the outflow of such a human 
capital was thought to be wastage of the scarce resources.  However, recent 
research has provided the opposite conclusion1. The possibility of beneficiary 
brain drain formally investigated and it has been shown that immigration has a 
positive effect for source sountry, through higher incentive for skill formation. 
The possibility of beneficial “brain drain” has also been empirically detected. 
Thus, a considerable consensus has emerged about the effect of brain drain on 
sending countries.  
 
                                                 
§ Center for International Climate and Environmental Research – Oslo (CICERO) P.O. Box 1129 
Blindern, N-0318 Oslo, Norway 
1 Beine et al. (2001), Chau and Stark (1999), Davenport (2004), Docquier and Rapoport (2003), 
Hemmi (2005), Lien (2006), Stark (2004), Stark et al. (1997) and Stark et al. (1998) 
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In order to understand the effect on receiving countries, the natural starting 
point has been the neoclassical migration theory, such as the one by Berry and 
Soligo (1969). According to the neoclassical model migration, the arrival of 
immigrants improves welfare as long as it alters the capital-output ratio in the 
host nation either through raising labor supply or through raising the stock of 
capital. Changes in the capital-output ratio results in the increase in 
remuneration of the ex-post scarce factor which offsets the decrease the marginal 
return of the ex-post abundant factor, resulting in an over all potential Pareto 
improvement.  Recent paper by Kemnitz (2001) challenges this consensus by 
resorting to the AK type of argument.  
 
Kemnitz (2001) using the AK model argued that when  social interest rate is 
constant and increase in the immigration raises the return of the abundance 
factor if and only if typical migrant posses greater capital than typical natives’. 
Hence, the welfare gain from immigration depends whether immigrants are 
capital rich or not. We argue that the AK framework, which argues that 
accumulation of knowledge is an accidental by-product of investment activity, is 
not suitable, at least, for understanding the gains from immigration for four 
reasons.  
 
First and foremost, one need not be invited to visit the Silicon Valley of the US, 
the Oslo innovation area of Norway, the Bangalore ( which is also known as the 
Silicon Valley of India), Canada's Technology Triangle, the Dresden ( which is 
also called the Silicon Valley of Germany), the Digital Harbour at Docklands in 
Australia, the High Tech Campus Eindhoven of the Netherlands, the Silicon Fen 
of the U. K., and  Stockholm’s Wireless Valley of the Sweden to understand that 
technical change is an intentionally directed activity.  
 
Moreover, there is sufficient evidence that the share of capital in production is 
below one. For example, Mankiw, Romer, Weil (1992) or Jones (2002, pp165-166) 
suggested, after considering the broader capital, the share of capital to be 2/3 or 
at most 4/5.  
 3
 
Further more, AK model is at odd with a number of empirical regularities such as 
1970s productivity slow down, conditional convergence, absolute convergence of 
OECD countries, lack of persistence in growth, etc2.  
 
Finally, the AK-model based view understates the importance of migration in 
endogenous growth framework. By focusing on capital accumulation alone, it 
rules out benefits associated with skill, market, and profitability. 
 
I argue that immigration is win–win for both the immigrant and the natives. The 
intuition behind the result to follow is simple. In the setting where firms 
undertake purposive R& D, the incentive for innovation depends up on the 
profitability of the intermediate goods sector, which in turn positively depends 
upon the size of the market. Moreover, the wage of a typical worker depends up 
on its own productivity (the variety of intermediate goods), which in turn depends 
up on the size of the market. Thus, more migrants raise the profitability of 
intermediate sector and greater migration involves Pareto improvement for 
workers and intermediate goods producers3. 
 
Model 
Let  ( )N t  be the number of natives at time, t  and ( )M t  be the number of 
migrants in the same year. Thus the total labor force, ( )L t  in the economy is given 
by the sum of the two. 
 
(1)    ( ) ( ) ( )L t N t M t= +  
 
The final goods sector uses the aggregate production function which employs 
labor, ( )L t  and intermediary input, { } 0Ai ix =  to produce final good, ( )Y t  which is the 
numeraire. The final good is sold at a competitive market. 
                                                 
2 Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (2005) present a detailed account of AK models. 
3 I will follow the same approach like Kemnitz (2001) to show that the result that follows comes 
from the production function than any thing else. 
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(2)    1
0
( ) ( ) ( )
A
iY t L t x t di
α α−= ∫ , [ ]0,i A∈    
 
The optimal demand for labor and intermediaries satisfy the 
problem
{ } 1
1
0( ), ( ) 0
max ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
A i
i i
A
A
i x j
L t x t
L t x t di w t L t x t djα α φ
=
− − −∫ ∫ , where ( )w t  and ixφ  are the price of a 
unit of labor and intermediate good “ i ”, respectively.  
 
1
1
( ) ( )
i
i
x
x t L t
αα
φ
−⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
(3)    ( )( ) (1 )
( )
Y tL t
w t
α= −  
 
The R& D sector is characterised by monopolies producing each intermediate 
goods. The monopolies of each intermediate good maximize profit subject to the 
demand constraint imposed by final goods sector, (3).  We assume each 
intermediate good is produced with τ  units of intermediate good. Thus, each 
producer solves the problem { }max i
i
x i i
x
x xφ τ−  subject to the demand constraint 
given by
1
1
( ) ( )
i
i
x
x t L t
αα
φ
−⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
.  The optimal price of each monopolist is given by a 
constant. 
 
(4)    
ix x
τφ φ α= =  
 
 
Proposition 1: When research is purposive, intermediate good producers respond 
to profits. The profit from the production of each intermediate  good an increasing 
function of the labor that compliments intermediate goods in the production of 
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final goods. Hence, immigration provides intermediate good producers greater 
incentive and hence raises the return from innovation. 
 
Proof: 
Equation (4) implies that the quantity of each type of intermediary is 
equal, ( ) ( )ix t x t=  and using (3) and (4), the profit of the intermediate goods 
producing monopolist, ( )tπ  is given by
1 1
1 1( ) (1 ) ( )t L t
αα ααπ α α τ
+ −− ⎡ ⎤= − ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ . In the event of 
zero immigration profit becomes ( | 0)t Mπ =  and positive immigration the profit 
becomes ( | 0)t Mπ >  which is given by, 
 
( | 0)t Mπ = = 
1
1 1
(1 ) ( )N t
α α
α
αα τ
+ −⎡ ⎤− ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
  
(5)   ( | 0)t Mπ > = 
1 1
1 11 1
(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )N t M t
α αα α
α α
α αα ατ τ
+ +− −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− + −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
  
 
What is left is to show that the inequality ( | 0) ( | 0)t M t Mπ π> > =  holds.  
 
(6)     ( | 0) ( )1 ( | 0) ( | 0)
( | 0) ( )
t M M t t M t M
t M N t
π π ππ
> = + ⇔ > > ==  QED. 
 
But the fact that there is greater profit from the same unit of intermediary , 
( | 0) ( | 0)t M t Mπ π> > = , implies that the incentive  to innovate  and it implies 
that the number of varieties, ( )A t  is greater in the presence of immigration than 
without, ( | 0) ( | 0)A t M A t M= < > . 
 
Proposition 2: The productivity, and hence wage, of each worker is an increasing 
function of the number of intermediate goods used in the production of final goods. 
By creating greater incentive for the production of intermediate goods, 
immigration raises the return of each labour by raising their productivity. Thus, 
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the arrival of immigrants raises the wage of average worker, including the 
natives, independent of the amount of capital each immigrant posses.  
 
Proof:  
At optimum, the demand for intermediary is increasing function of the total labor 
used in the production of final goods
1
2 1
( ) ( ( ) ( ))x t N t M t
αα
τ
−⎡ ⎤= +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
. The total final 
good also given by (7) in the absence and presence of immigration is given by  
  
2 1
( | ( ) 0) ( | 0) ( )Y t M t A t M N t
α
αα
τ
−⎡ ⎤= = = ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
  
(7)   [ ] 2 1( | ( ) 0) ( | 0) ( ) ( )Y t M t A t M N t M t
α
αα
τ
−⎡ ⎤> = > + ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
  
 
The wage of average worker, including a native, using equation (3) and 
substituting
1
1
( ) ( )
i
i
x
x t L t
αα
φ
−⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
, in the absence of immigration, is given by  
(8.1)   
2 1
( | ( ) 0) (1 ) ( | ( ) 0)w t M t A t M t
α
ααα τ
−⎡ ⎤= = − = ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
  
 
On the other hand, in the presence of positive number of migrants, the wage is 
given by 
(8.2)   
2 1
( | ( ) 0) (1 ) ( | ( ) 0)w t M t A t M t
α
ααα τ
−⎡ ⎤> = − > ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
  
 
What remains is to show is that wage is greater in the presence of 
immigration, ( | ( ) 0) ( | ( ) 0)w t M t w t M t> > =  Taking the ratio of (8. 1) to (8.2) and 
rearranging we have ( | ( ) 0) ( | ( ) 0)w t M t w t M t> > =  since ( | 0) ( | 0)A t M A t M= < > . 
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Conclusion 
In the presence of horizontal innovations, the profitability of the intermediate 
goods producing sector and the wage in the final goods producing sector depends 
on the size of the market. Unlike, the result based on AK type models, the result 
above implies that both workers and intermediate goods producing firms are 
better off in the presence of immigration. In fact, as Rodrik (2001) noted, “… 
every economist knows, the efficiency cost of any policy-imposed ("artificial") price 
wedge is proportional to the square of the wedge.  Where international markets for 
commodities and financial assets are concerned, these price wedges rarely exceed a 
ratio of 2:1.  Where labor services are concerned, however, wages of similarly 
qualified individuals in the advanced and low-income countries differ by a factor 
of 10 or more.  So the gains from liberalizing labor movements across countries 
are enormous, and much larger than the likely benefits from further liberalization 
in the traditional areas of goods and capital.  If international policy makers were 
really interested in maximizing worldwide efficiency, they would spend little of 
their energies on a new trade round or on the international financial architecture.  
They would all be busy at work liberalizing immigration restrictions. 
         
CICERO, Blindern 
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